Nonlinear Blockchain Scalability: a Game-Theoretic Perspective by Chen, Lin et al.
Nonlinear Blockchain Scalability: a Game-Theoretic
Perspective
Lin Chen
Department of Computer Science, Texas Tech University,
TX, USA
chenlin198662@gmail.com
Lei Xu
Department of Computer Science, University of Texas Rio
Grande Valley, TX, USA
xuleimath@gmail.com
Zhimin Gao
Department of Computer Science, Auburn University at
Montgomery, AL, USA
mtion@msn.com
Keshav Kasichainula,Weidong Shi
Department of Computer Science, University of Houston,
TX, USA
kkasichainula@uh.edu,
larryshi@ymail.com
ABSTRACT
Recent advances in the blockchain research have been made in two
important directions. One is refined resilience analysis utilizing game
theory to study the consequences of selfish behaviors of users (min-
ers), and the other is the extension from a linear (chain) structure to a
non-linear (graphical) structure for performance improvements, such
as IOTA and Graphcoin. The first question that comes to people’s
minds is what improvements that a blockchain system would see
by leveraging these new advances. In this paper, we consider three
major metrics for a blockchain system: full verification, scalability,
and finality-duration. We establish a formal framework and prove
that no blockchain system can achieve full verification, high scal-
ability, and low finality-duration simultaneously. We observe that
classical blockchain systems like Bitcoin achieves full verification
and low finality-duration, Harmony and Ethereum 2.0 achieve low
finality-duration and high scalability. As a complementary, we de-
sign a non-linear blockchain system that achieves full verification
and scalability. We also establish, for the first time, the trade-off
between scalability and finality-duration.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Blockchain technology provides a mechanism for untrusted parties
to carry out transactions without a fully trusted central system. The
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basic idea behind this is that, instead of having trust in a centralized
system or any other specific participant, each participant chooses
to trust the majority of the participants and accepts the outcome
achieved through consensus among them.
One major reason that hinders the adoption of blockchain is
scalability [22]. For example, Bitcoin network can only process
less than 10 transactions per second on average [6], while typical
payment systems like Visa can process thousands of transactions per
second.
Recently, a variety of approaches are proposed to address the
scalability issue. Most of them follow the general framework of
divide and conquer, e.g., Zilliqa [19], Harmony [18], and Ethereum
2.0 [17], and use a sharding scheme that allows transactions to
be processed by a subgroup of nodes (a sharding committee). A
sharding scheme usually has a critical issue in terms of resilience,
as the correctness of each transaction now solely depends on a
subgroup of voters. Consequently, if common consensus protocols
like Proof-of-Work (PoW) or Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) is
used within subgroups, then the fraction of malicious nodes within
every subgroup cannot exceed 1/2 or 1/3, which is a significantly
stronger assumption than that of a standard blockchain system, which
only requires that the fraction of malicious nodes does not exceed 1/2
or 1/3 of all nodes. We remark that both Harmony and Ethereum 2.0
claim that if subgroups are generated in a perfect randomized way,
then the percentage of honest nodes within each subgroup is almost
the same as their percentage in the whole group of nodes; however,
this requires a perfect distributed random number generation as a
separate procedure, which brings an additional assumption on the
security of this additional procedure.
If we aim to guarantee that every transaction is correctly executed
by only relying on the standard assumption that the majority of the
nodes are honest, then it is natural to require every transaction to be
verified by all the nodes. Consequently, it is a natural question of
whether scalability is achievable at all, as it appears that any divide
and conquer based solution would inevitably reduce the total number
of verifications received by a transaction. A “non-linear" blockchain
structure recently introduced by IOTA [13] and Graphcoin [2] brings
the hope. The basic idea is to allow blocks to be connected as a
directed acyclic graph (DAG) instead of a chain. Such a non-linear
structure implements a divide and conquers approach implicitly by
allowing multiple blocks to be appended simultaneously, as a general
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graph can be extended in multiple directions. Meanwhile, if we treat
different growing directions as soft forks or branches, then they have
the possibility (depending on system parameters) to “merge" again
in the future (see the following figure 2, where the sequences of
blocks the following block A and B meet at block C). Therefore,
if a node who tries to append a new block is required to verify a
few previous blocks, there is a possibility that a block may still be
verified by all the nodes, albeit the delay of such verification.
On a high level, there are three crucial metrics involved in a
general blockchain system: full verification, scalability, and finality-
duration. In a nutshell, full verification requires every transaction to
be verified by essentially all the nodes (which thus ensures resilience
under the standard assumption that majority of the nodes follow
the protocol); scalability means the system throughput, or the total
number of transactions executed per unit of time, is proportional to
the total number of participating nodes; and finality-duration means
the delay in reaching consensus on the correctness of the execution
of each transaction. We give a precise definition later.
Classical blockchain systems like Bitcoin achieves full verifica-
tion and low finality-duration, but not scalability. This is because
Bitcoin requires every block, and hence the transactions within a
block, to be verified by all the nodes; meanwhile, it has a constant
finality-duration because every block is finalized after a constant
number of blocks are appended afterward. However, it does not
scale, as the increase in the number of nodes does not allow the
system to handle more transactions per unit of time, which has been
pointed out in many prior papers. On the other hand, blockchain
systems like Harmony [18] and Ethereum 2.0 [17] achieve constant
finality-duration and scalability, but not full verification.
In this paper, we provide a view on the relationships between
fully verification, low finality-duration, and scalability. We also con-
sider the potential trade-off among these three metrics. Our detailed
contribution is summarized as follows:
Our contributions. Based on a counting argument, we show that it
is impossible to achieve full verification, low finality-duration and
scalability simultaneously.
Given our impossibility result, and the fact that: (i) Bitcoin achieves
full verification and low (constant) finality-duration, but not scala-
bility; and (ii) Harmony and Ethereum 2.0 achieves low (constant)
finality-duration and scalability, but not full verification, It is nat-
ural to ask whether there exists a blockchain system that satisfies
both full verification and scalability. We prove that, interestingly,
a modified version of a non-linear blockchain system, which is in
line with a well-known blockchain system – IOTA, can achieve both
full verification and scalability at the cost of high (non-constant)
finality-duration. We further employ a game-theoretical analysis to
characterize the trade-off between scalability and finality-duration
for such a non-linear blockchain system. Informally speaking, the
followings hold simultaneously for the non-linear blockchain sys-
tem:
(i) O(s) new blocks are generated per unit of time on average;
(i) after O(s log s) units of time, with a very high probability, each
block will be verified by all users in the systems.
Here s is a system parameter that can be set suitably at the genesis
block. When s = 1, the non-linear system degenerates to a linear
system with a fixed block generation rate that is independent of the
nodes in the system, while the delay is a constant. This coincides
with the classical Bitcoin system. On the other hand, s can be as high
as O(m) wherem is the number of nodes in the system. In this case,
the system is fully scalable, albeit that only a sufficiently long delay
(O(s log s)) can ensure full verification. However, if we set s to be
O(m) to enforce scalability and meanwhile enforce the delay to be
some constant instead of O(s log s), then full verification cannot be
guaranteed.
We remark that the big-O notation in our statements hides a con-
stant which is roughly the average time for a block to be generated,
that is, we measure the delay in terms of the number of blocks;
therefore, Bitcoin is considered as low finality-duration as the delay
is constant blocks. Our result does not conflict with prior researches
that complain about the “high" finality-duration of Bitcoin because
of the long time it takes to generate a single block. The research that
tries to decrease such a block generation time is parallel to this paper.
For example, if a lighter version of PoW can be used in the existing
Bitcoin system, then it can also be used directly in our non-linear
blockchain system, while our impossibility result, as well as the
trade-off between finality-duration and scalability, remain the same.
2 RELATED WORKS
The study of e-cash systems dates back to 1983 [3, 15]. However,
all such systems require a centrally or quasi-centrally controlling
authority. A well-known exception, Bitcoin, was introduced by
Nakamoto [10] in 2008, which uses a public ledger known as a
blockchain to record transactions carried out between users. Fol-
lowing this line of research, various alternative blockchain-based
transaction systems are proposed [9, 16, 20], further improving
the performance and security of Bitcoin as well as extending the
system to deal with applications beyond transactions (e.g., smart
contracts). We refer the readers to several surveys on blockchain
systems [1, 4, 7, 8, 14, 21, 23]. In particular, [21] provides a com-
prehensive introduction to the bitcoin network, [4, 7, 14] focus on
the security and privacy results on blockchain, [1] focuses on the
applications of blockchain. The most relevant survey to this paper
is [8], which summarizes recent results on game-theoretical stud-
ies of blockchain. However, most of the existing game theoretical
research primarily focuses on the traditional linear blockchain sys-
tem, only a very recent paper of Popov et al. [12] gives the first
game-theoretical analysis of IOTA. Their result, however, does not
establish the trade-off between scalability and finality-duration.
2.1 Classical and Non-linear Blockchain
Chain-structured blockchain. Most of the existing blockchain sys-
tems, e.g., Bitcoin, Ethereum, Hyperledger, follow the classical
structure where blocks form a chain as illustrated by Fig 1.
Non-linear (graph-structured) blockchain. Popov introduced the
concept of tangle [13] which allows a blockchain to adopt a directed
acyclic graph (DAG) architecture. We summarize the abstract model
of a non-linear blockchain in Section 3. We briefly review IOTA,
which is the most well-known non-linear blockchain system so far.
On a high level, IOTA allows each transaction be an individual node
linked in the distributed ledger. We may interpret a transaction as
a block in such a system. In the tangle, each user needs to select
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Figure 1: Chain-structured blockchain. White squares form the
main chain, and gray squares form the side chains that are dis-
carded eventually.
one transaction from the pool as well as two previous blocks (trans-
actions) in the system. The user verifies these two transactions and
mines a new block referring to them. Then this new block (transac-
tion) is broadcasted to the tangle network. Figure 2 gives a simple
example of a non-linear blockchain.
Figure 2: A non-linear blockchain. White squares are verified
transactions/blocks.
3 THE ABSTRACT MODEL
We describe an abstract model of a non-linear blockchain which
is general enough to incorporate existing well-known non-linear
blockchain systems like IOTA and Graphcoin.
A non-linear blockchain NLB is defined by a quadruple
NLB : (A,C,R, E),where
• A defines the rules of building and adding a new block to the
blockchain. Since we are considering non-linear blockchain,
A allows multiple blocks to be added simultaneously.
• C defines the way to check a block, including validity ver-
ification, such as whether the block has the correct format
and whether transactions included in the block are valid, and
whether the block is finalized.
• R defines the way how the award is assigned to a user who
adds a new block to the DAG. A NLB needs to encourage
users to participate in the construction of the blockchain by
giving rewards to those who add new blocks.
• E defines the rules to eliminate conflict blocks. Similar to a
linear blockchain, it is possible that multiple participants have
different local copies of the blockchain, and E determines
which version should be kept.
Next, we provide provide formal definitions of the three metrics
of a blockchain system we mentioned earlier.
DEFINITION 1 (FULL VERIFICATION). A blockchain system
satisfies the property of full verification if every block is verified by
all the nodes in the system before it is finalized.
If a blockchain system satisfies full verification, then resilience
follows directly from standard assumptions on the percentage of
honest nodes among all nodes, e.g., if the blockchain uses PoW or
BFT as the consensus protocol, then it is resilient once the majority
or 2/3 of nodes follow the protocol.
DEFINITION 2 (SCALABILITY). The throughput of a blockchain
system is the number of blocks nb that can be added to the system in
a fixed time. A blockchain system scales with the number of nodesm
in the system if nb → ∞ when m → ∞. Particularly, a blockchain
system fully scales with the number of nodesm if nb = Ω(m).
It should be clear that the definition of scalability or fully scala-
bility does not depend on the length of the time period chosen for
throughput. It captures the possibility of speeding up blockchain
generation with more participating nodes; consequently, classical
blockchain systems like Bitcoin does not scale at all.
DEFINITION 3 (FINALITY-DURATION). The finality-duration of
a blockchain system is the time difference between the time point
when a block is appended and the time point when a block receives
full verification.
We say the finality-duration of a blockchain system is low (or
constant) if the finality-duration is independent of the nodes in the
system; consequently, classical blockchain systems like Bitcoin has
a low finality-duration because after a fixed number of blocks are
appended, all the nodes start following the main chain, thus blocks
on the main chain will receive full verification.
4 IMPOSSIBILITY RESULT
THEOREM 1. There does not exist a blockchain system that si-
multaneously satisfies (i) scalability; (ii) low finality-duration; and
(iii) full verification.
The proof follows from a counting argument on the total number
of verifications. See full version.
5 ACHIEVING FULL VERIFICATION WITH
TRADE-OFF BETWEEN SCALABILITY
AND FINALITY-DURATION
As we have mentioned before, classical blockchain systems like
Bitcoin achieve full verification and low finality-duration at the cost
of scalability, Harmony and Ethereum 2.0 achieve scalability and
low finality-duration at the cost of full verification. In this section,
we complement the characterization by constructing a non-linear
blockchain system, which is a modified version of IOTA, and show
that it achieves full verification and scalability at the cost of finality-
duration. We will further characterize the trade-off between the
scalability and finality-duration, allowing the system to balance
these two parameters for different applications.
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5.1 Non-linear Blockchain (NLB) Construction
We first propose a concrete construction of NLB that achieves both
security and scalability under the agent model. Without loss of
generality, we assume that each block only includes one transaction.
In the following, we broaden the terms and use them interchangeably.
We first define some concepts.
DEFINITION 4 (BLOCK DISTANCE, DESCENDANT, AND ANCES-
TOR). Given two blocks A and B, we define the distance between
the two blocks as the length of the shortest directly path from A to B,
which is denoted as d(A,B). If there is no such a directed path, we
define d(A,B) = ∞. If 0 < d(A,B) < ∞, we say A is a descendant of
B, and B is an ancestor of A. For a block B and each 1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ, let
Anc(B,k) = {X |d(X ,B) = k} and Des(B,k) = {d(B,X ) = k}, where
ℓ is a given parameter.
The new NLB is constructed as follows:
• A. The new NLB assumes that there is a pool of new trans-
actions from which a user can select one to construct a new
block, which refers to two previous blocks1. The user then
does lightweight mining to fix this information in the newly
constructed block. Suppose that the newly built block is B,
the user also verifies blocks in Anc(B,k), 1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ, where ℓ
is a pre-defined system parameter that determines how many
previous blocks the producer of a new block should verify.
• C. To check a block B, the algorithm first checks whether
the block format is correct, including the verification of the
mining outcome. The algorithm also checks whether B is
finalized or not, which is determined by
numAnc ← | ∪ℓk=1 Anc(B,k)|.
If numAnc is larger than the system pre-defined threshold, B
is finalized.
• R. Each block has a reward value and the system imposes
an upper bound on the maximal reward offered by a trans-
action, so that the largest and smallest reward among trans-
actions (and blocks) can differ by a factor at most ∆. The
producer of the new block also receives rewards from pre-
vious blocks. Specifically, each block is associated with a
uniform verification cost vrf, which is divided into ℓ parts
such that vrf1 < vrf2 < · · · < vrfℓ and
∑ℓ
k=1 vrfk = vrf.
For each 1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ, the producer of block B gets reward
vrfk/|Des(X ,k)| for each X ∈ Anc(B,k). This means that the
verification reward of vrfk from block X is evenly distributed
among all is descendants in Des(B,k). Note that the reward
will be only collected when the new block is finalized.
• E. The constructed NLB adopts the largest-weighted-descendants
principle (LWD) to eliminate disagreement. For each block B,
let Des(B) = ∪h≥1{X |d(B,X )}. If there are two conflicting
blocks B, B′ and |Des(B)| > |Des(B′)|, then B prevails, that
is, users will abandon B′ together with all its descendants
in the sense that a new block will not refer to any of these
blocks.
1Our analysis in this paper also works if a new block refers to any fixed constant (greater
than or equal to 2) number of blocks. For ease of presentation, we take this number to
be 2 throughout this paper.
5.2 Scalability and Finality-duration Analysis
We first give a high-level summarization of the workflow of the
proposed NLB system. Transactions are generated over time and
form a pool. Each transaction is associated with a distinct transaction
reward and a fixed verification reward vrf. Each time, a miner will
select one transaction from the pool and append a block, which refers
to two previous blocks. Here the miner needs to decide two things:
(i) which transaction to include, and (ii) which two previous blocks
to refer to. As we assume that miners are rational players, they will
strategically make their decisions to maximize their profits, and this
section is devoted to analyzing the scalability and security of the
system under an arbitrary Nash equilibrium.
We formalize the problem as follows. Let the pool consist of
n transactions, with the transaction reward being p1,p2, · · · ,pn .
Let m be the number of miners, with computational powers be-
ing u1,u2, · · · ,um . As we mentioned, each miner will mine a new
block by including one transaction from the pool. If multiple miners
say, miners in the subset of S , all choose the same transaction, then
they compete, and only one of them will succeed, and the probability
that some miner i ∈ S succeeds is ui∑
h∈S uh
. If, however, all miners
choose different transactions, then each of them can append a new
block.
In the following section, we will analyze the scalability and
finality-duration of the constructed NLB separately.
5.2.1 Scalability. For scalability, we are interested in how many
different transactions from the pool can be selected by the miners
simultaneously. Note that the more different transactions are chosen,
the higher scalability is. By considering the situation where miners
choose transactions simultaneously, we are considering the worst-
case because if miners are selecting transactions at different times,
later ones may be able to avoid conflicts with earlier ones. Let n
be the number of available transactions and m be the number of
miners, the following Theorem 2 implies that the system is scalable
even in the worst case such that when there are sufficiently many
transactions, the throughput will be O(m/∆) where ∆ is a system
parameter part of R. By controlling ∆, we can control the scalability
of the system. In particular, when we set ∆ to be a constant, the
system becomes fully scale with the number of nodes.
The following of this subsection is devoted to proving Theorem 2.
THEOREM 2. With probability at least 1 −max{e−Θ(m), e−Θ(n)},
the number of blocks mined bym miners in an arbitrary Nash equi-
librium is at least min{c1m/∆, c2n} for some universal constants
c1, c2.
Notice that a Nash equilibrium always exists by allowing mixed
strategies [11]. Towards the proof, we introduce some notations. For
simplicity, let all the transaction rewards be p1 ≥ p2 ≥ · · · ≥ pn .
By the design of our system we require that p1/pn ≤ ∆. Note that
the strategy of a miner is to select one transaction. We consider
the general mixed strategy of a miner where he/she can specify a
probability for each transaction.
Consider an arbitrary Nash equilibrium and let π (i) = (π (i)1 ,
π
(i)
2 , · · · ,π
(i)
n ) be the strategy of miner i in the equilibrium, where
π
(i)
j is the probability that he chooses transaction j. It is obvious
that
∑n
j=1 π
(i)
j = 1 for any 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Let X
(i)
j be the 0-1 random
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variable that indicates whether miner i chooses transaction j. Then
X
(i)
j = 1 with probability π
(i)
j and X
(i)
j = 0 with probability 1 − π
(i)
j .
Consider the above Nash equilibrium. Intuitively, if only a small
number of transactions are selected, then miners must have devoted
their probabilities to a few transactions. Therefore, to show that a
sufficient number of distinct transactions are selected in expectation
by miners, we need to show that the miners are distributing their
probabilities in a fair way among transactions, as is implied by the
following lemma.
LEMMA 1. If there exists some transaction j1 such that
∑m
i=1 π
(i)
j1
≥
12∆, then for every transaction j it holds that
∑m
i=1 π
(i)
j ≥ 1/2.
PROOF. Suppose on the contrary that the lemma is not true, that
is, there exists some transactions j1 and j2 such that
∑m
i=1 π
(i)
j1
≥
12∆ and
∑m
i=1 π
(i)
j2
< 1/2. Consider the set of miners that choose
transaction j1 with positive probability. For simplicity, let these
miners be miner 1, 2, · · · ,k such that u1 ≥ u2 ≥ · · · ≥ uk . We
show in the following that miner k can change his strategy to get
a strictly higher profit, contradicting the fact that this is a Nash
equilibrium, and consequently, the lemma is proved. More precisely,
we argue that player k can get strictly larger profit (in expectation) by
increasing his probability of choosing transaction j2 and meanwhile
decreasing his probability of choosing j1.
The expected profit that miner k can get from transaction j1 and
j2 using his current strategy is equal to
pj1E[Γ1] + pj2E[Γ2],
where for h = 1, 2, we have
Γh =

0, if
∑n
i=1 uiX
(i)
jh
= 0
ukX
(k )
jh∑m
i=1 uiX
(i )
jh
, Otherwise.
If k changes his strategy by choosing j1 with the probability of 0
and choosing j2 with the probability of π
(k )
j1
+π
(k )
j2
, then the expected
profit he can get from j1 and j2 is equal to pj2E[Γ˜2], where
Γ˜2 =

0, if
∑
i,k uiX
(i)
j2
+ uk X˜
(k )
j2
= 0
uk X˜
(k )
j2∑
i,k uiX
(i )
j2
+uk X˜
(k )
j2
, Otherwise.
and X˜ (k )j2 is the 0-1 random variable that takes the value 1 with the
probability of π (k )j1 + π
(k )
j2
.
In the following we show that
pj2E[Γ˜2 − Γ2] > pj1E[Γ1],
which implies the correctness of the lemma. We prove the following
two claims.
CLAIM 1. E[Γ1] <
π (k )j1
2∆ .
CLAIM 2. E[Γ˜2 − Γ2] ≥ π (k )j1 /2.
Given the two claims and the fact that pj2 ≤ ∆pj1 , pj2E[Γ˜2 −
Γ2] > pj1E[Γ1] follows and the lemma is proved. The proof of the
two claims is quite involved. Please refer to the full version for
details. □
Lemma 1 shows that: Either no transaction has received a total
amount of probability that is larger than 12∆, or every transaction
receives a total amount of probability at least 1/2. Note that the
two cases are not mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, we show in the
following that in both cases, miners will select sufficiently many
transactions with very high probability. The proofs of the following
lemmas are mathematically involved. Please refer to the full version
for details.
LEMMA 2. Let k, 1/δ ∈ N+ such that kδ = ζ ∈ (0, 1). Let
a1,a2, · · · ,an be n numbers such that ai ∈ [0,δ ], ∑ni=1 ai = 1. LetA = {S |S ⊆ {1, 2, · · · ,n}, |S | = k}. Then we have∑
S ∈A
(
∑
j ∈S
aj )m ≤ ekζm−k .
LEMMA 3. If
∑m
i=1 π
(i)
j < 12∆ holds for every transaction j, and
∆ ≤ m/12, then the probability that only k ≤ m12e∆ = Θ(m/∆)
different transactions are selected bym miners is at most (1/e)Θ(m).
Note that if ∆ > m/12, m12e∆ < 1. As miners complete at least 1
transaction, the lemma is trivially true. Now we consider the other
case and have the following.
LEMMA 4. If
∑m
i=1 π
(i)
j ≥ 1/2 holds for every transaction j, then
the probability that no more than n/e2 transactions are selected is
at most (1/e)Θ(n).
Given Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, Theorem 2 follows directly.
5.2.2 Finality-duration. For ease of presentation, let s = min{c1m/∆, c2n}
(recall Theorem 2). We will characterized finality-duration in terms
of s.
Recall that a miner needs to make two decisions: (i) which transac-
tion to include in the new block, and (ii) which two previous blocks
to refer to. The two decisions are independent. In the previous sub-
section we have discussed (i), and in this subsection we focus on (ii),
as this affects how the DAG grows.
It should be clear that since the verification reward of a transaction
(block) is evenly distributed among miners who append a block
of the same distance to it, a miner always prefers a block with
no descendants. At any particular time t , we call a block without
descendants as a leaf at t , and denote by Lt the set of leaves. We are
interested in the size of Lt . Notice that in the classical blockchain
system, |Lt | is 1 since it is a chain. However, in a non-linear model,
|Lt | is not necessarily 1. In principle, |Lt | could grow arbitrarily
large, but what we will show in this section is that, |Lt | is always
bounded when miners are taking their equilibrium strategies. In this
case, although we are considering a non-linear model, it is “almost
linear", as implied by Theorem 3. Based on this result, we further
leverage the techniques from random walk to prove that, for every
block, after a delay of O(s log s) units of time, all blocks will be its
descendant (Theorem 4), consequently, if we set ℓ = Θ(s log s) in
our design, every block will be verified by all the users, and security
follows.
As we mentioned before, each new block will refer to two leaves
in Lt . As every block offers the same total amount of verification
reward, every leaf appears the same to the miners (unless they are in
conflict with previous blocks and then miners will be biased based
on the LWD rule). Therefore, a new block will randomly select
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two leaves to refer to. Assuming leaves are not conflicting with
previous blocks, we show that |Lt | will be O(s) in the long run with
an extremely high probability.
First, it is easy to see that if |Lt | ≤ s, then Lt+1 ≥ s as the s new
blocks will be leaves at t +1. The following lemma shows that if |Lt |
is sufficiently large, then with very high probability it will reduce to
O(s) after enough time.
LEMMA 5. Let ϵ be an arbitary small constant. If |Lt | ≥ 1/ϵ3
and |Lt | ≥ 4s, then with sufficiently high probability (at least 1 −
O(ϵ)), |Lt+1 | = |Lt | − X + s ≤ |Lt | − (1−3ϵ )s2 , i.e., Lt decreases by
at least Ω(s).
PROOF. Consider an arbitrary Lt . For any τi ∈ Lt and any new
block b, the probability that b refers to τi is 2/|Lt |, hence, the prob-
ability that none of the s new blocks refer to τi is (1 − 2/|Lt |)s ,
i.e., the probability that an arbitrary τi has descendant(s) at t + 1 is
θ = 1 − (1 − 2/|Lt |)s .
Let a random variable Xi denote whether the event that τi has
descendant(s) at t + 1, then Pr(Xi = 1) = θ and Pr(Xi = 0) = 1 − θ .
Denote by X =
∑ |Lt |
i=1 Xi the total number of leaves in Lt that has
descendant(s) at t + 1.
According to Chernoff bound, with the probability of at least
1 − 2e−ϵ 2 |EX |/3, (1 − ϵ)EX ≤ X ≤ (1 + ϵ)EX . Now we estimate EX .
It is easy to verify that
2s − 2s(s − 1)|Lt | ≤ EX = |Lt | − |Lt |(1 −
2
|Lt | )
s ≤ 2s .
Hence, if |Lt | ≥ 1/ϵ3 and |Lt | ≥ 4s, then with sufficiently high
probability (at least 1 − 2e−1/(3ϵ ) = 1 − O(ϵ)), X ≥ (1 − ϵ)EX ≥
3/2 · (1 − ϵ)s, consequently,
|Lt+1 | = |Lt | − X + s ≤ |Lt | − (1 − 3ϵ)s2 . □
The above lemma shows that if |Lt | is large, then with high
probability |Lt | shall decrease, however, what we are interested in
is the probability that |Lt | ≤ O(s) for all t ≥ 0. Towards this, we
need to cast the problem as a random walk. Lemma 5 shows that
with the probability of (1 − O(ϵ))3 = 1 − O(ϵ), |Lt | can decrease
by 3(1−3ϵ )s2 ≥ s, while with probability of at most O(ϵ), |Lt | can
increase by at most s. This can be interpreted as a random walk which
walks right (increase) by s steps with the probability of 1−O(ϵ), and
walks left (decrease) by s steps with the probability of O(ϵ). The
following lemma is proved for a general random walk.
LEMMA 6 ([5], PP.272). Consider a random walk starting at
RW0 = 0, Pr(RWi+1 − RWi = s) = p, Pr(RWi+1 − RWi = −s) = q
where p + q = 1 and s ∈ Z>0. If p > q, then
lim
n→∞ Pr(RWi ≥ 0, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n) =
p − q
p
.
If p < q, the above limit is 0.
Now we are ready to prove the following theorem.
THEOREM 3. Let ϵ be a small constant such that s > 1/ϵ3. With
very high probability (at least 1 −O(ϵ)), |Lt | ≤ 5s for all t ≥ 0.
PROOF. Recall that |L0 | = 0. Let t∗ be the smallest time where
|Lt ∗ | ≥ 4s, then |Lt ∗ | ≤ 5s. Now we take t∗ as a starting time, |Lt ∗ |
as a starting point and take the random walk interpretation. Using
Lemma 6, we have that
lim
n→∞ Pr(|Lt | ≤ |Lt ∗ |,∀1 ≤ t ≤ n) ≤
1 −O(ϵ) −O(ϵ)
1 −O(ϵ)
= 1 −O(ϵ).
Therefore, the probability that |Lt | is bounded by 5s for all t ≥ 0 is
at least 1 −O(ϵ). □
LEMMA 7. Let ϵ be a small constant such that s > 1/ϵ3. For any
transaction at t that is not in conflict with prior transactions, with
sufficiently high probability (at least 1−O(ϵ)) every block appended
at or after t +O(s log s) will be its descendant.
Given the above lemma, if we set ℓ, the verification depth to
be ℓ ≥ O(s log s), then any transaction at t will be verified by all
the users after O(s log s) units of time with high probability. The
following theorem is thus true.
THEOREM 4. If s > 1/ϵ3 and ℓ ≥ O(s log s), then with probabil-
ity at least 1 −O(ϵ), any transaction at t will be verified by all the
users after O(s log s) units of time.
Remark. Recall that the value of s = min{c1m/∆, c2n} can be
adjusted by setting different values of the system parameter ∆. The-
orem 4 shows the trade-off between the scalability and finality-
duration.
6 CONCLUSION
We provide the first systematic analysis on blockchain systems with
respect to three major parameters, full verification, scalability, and
finality-duration. We establish an impossibility result showing no
blockchain system can simultaneously achieve the three properties.
We complement the existing blockchain systems by establishing
the first NLB that achieves both full verification and scalability. We
also reveal, for the first time, the trade-off between scalability and
finality-duration in NLB. It is not clear whether a better trade-off
exists or not.
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APPENDIX
A PROOF OF THEOREM 1
PROOF OF THEOREM 1. Suppose, on the contrary, that there ex-
ists such a blockchain. Then by definition, every block or transaction
will receive verifications from all the nodes within a constant delay.
Let c0 be the constant delay. Consider an arbitrary node x and let
τx be the fixed time it takes for node x to perform one verification.
Let the throughput of the blockchain be nb , then by definition of
scalability we have nb = nb (m) → ∞ when m → ∞. Note that all
the nb blocks generated shall be verified by every node within the
delay of c0, which means every node should perform nb verifications
within c0. However, node x can only perform c0/τx verifications,
which is a constant. Since nb → ∞, when m is sufficiently large,
nb > c0/τx . Therefore, it is impossible for an arbitrary node x to
complete all the verifications. Hence, the three properties, scalabil-
ity, low finality-duration and full verifications, cannot be satisfied
simultaneously. □
B PROOF OF CLAIM 1
PROOF OF CLAIM 1. LetX =
∑
i,k X
(i)
j1
and µ = E[X ] ≥ 5∆/θ−
E[X (k )j1 ] = 6∆/θ − π
(k )
j1
. For any δ ∈ (0, 1), we have
E[Γ1] = E[Γ1 |X > (1 − δ )µ] Pr(X > (1 − δ )µ)
+E[Γ1 |X ≤ (1 − δ )µ] Pr(X ≤ (1 − δ )µ)
Given that Γ1 ≤ 1, we know that
E[Γ1 |X ≤ (1 − δ )µ]
= E[Γ1 |X ≤ (1 − δ )µ,X (k )j1 = 1] Pr(X
(k )
j1
= 1)
+E[Γ1 |X ≤ (1 − δ )µ,X (k)j1 = 0] Pr(X
(k )
j1
= 0)
= π
(k )
j1
· E[Γ1 |X ≤ (1 − δ )µ,X (k )j1 = 1] ≤ π
(k)
j1
.
Meanwhile, by u1 ≥ u2 ≥ · · · ≥ uk , we have
Γ1 ≤
X
(k )
j1∑k
i=1 X
(i)
j1
.
According to Chernoff bound, we know that
Pr(X ≤ (1 − δ )µ) ≤ e −δ
2µ
2 .
Therefore,
E[Γ1] = E[Γ1 |X > (1 − δ )µ] Pr(X > (1 − δ )µ)
+E[Γ1 |X ≤ (1 − δ )µ] Pr(X ≤ (1 − δ )µ)
≤ E[
X
(k )
j1
(1 − δ )µ + X (k )j1
] + e −δ
2µ
2 · π (k )j1
Consider the function φ(x) = x(1−δ )µ+x , it is easy to verify that
−φ(x) is convex in x ∈ (0,+∞), therefore, by Jensen’s inequality we
have
E[X (k )j1 ]
(1 − δ )µ + E[X (k )j1 ]
= φ(E[X (k )j1 ]) ≥ E[φ(X )]
= E[
X
(k )
j1
(1 − δ )µ + X (k)j1
].
Now consider the function xe−x . It is easy to verify that the function
decreases when x ≥ 1, therefore e−x ≤ 1ex for x ≥ 1, hence, for
δ 2µ
2 ≥ 1, we have
E[Γ1] ≤
E[X (k )j1 ]
(1 − δ )µ + E[X (k )j1 ]
+ e
−δ 2µ
2 · π (k )j1
≤
π
(k )
j1
(1 − δ )µ + π (k )j1
+
2
eδ2µ
· π (k)j1 .
Using the fact that µ ≥ 12∆ − π (k )j1 ≥ 11∆ and taking δ = 1/2, we
have
E[Γ1] ≤
π
(k)
j1
6∆ +
2π (k)j1
e · 1/4 · 11∆ <
π
(k )
j1
2∆ . □
C PROOF OF CLAIM 2
PROOF OF CLAIM 2. Let Y =
∑
i,k X
(i)
j2
. Then
Pr(Y = 0) = Pr(X (i)j2 = 0,∀i , k) =
∏
i,k
(1 − π ij2 )
≥ 1 −
∑
i,k
π
(i)
j2
≥ 1 − (1/2 − π (k )j2 )
= 1/2 + π (k )j2 .
Note that X (k )j2 and Y are independent, hence we have the following,
E[Γ˜2 − Γ2]
≥ E[Γ˜2 − Γ2 |Y = 0, X˜ (k )j2 > 0] Pr(Y = 0, X˜
(k)
j2
> 0)
≥ (π (k)j1 + π
(k)
j2
)(1/2 + π (k )j2 ) · E[Γ˜2 − Γ2 |Y = 0, X˜
(k )
j2
> 0].
Further notice that X˜ (k )j2 and X
(k)
j2
are independent, thus
E[Γ˜2 − Γ2 |Y = 0, X˜ (k)j2 > 0]
= E[Γ˜2 − Γ2 |Y = 0, X˜ (k)j2 > 0,X
(k )
j2
= 0]
· Pr(X (k )j2 = 0|Y = 0, X˜
(k)
j2
> 0)
+E[Γ˜2 − Γ2 |Y = 0, X˜ (k )j2 > 0,X
(k )
j2
> 0]
· Pr(X (k )j2 > 0|Y = 0, X˜
(k )
j2
> 0)
= E[
uk X˜
(k)
j2
Y + uk X˜
(k )
j2
|Y = 0, X˜ (k)j2 > 0,X
(k )
j2
= 0] · Pr(X (k )j2 = 0)
+E[
uk X˜
(k )
j2
Y + uk X˜
(k )
j2
−
ukX
(k )
j2
Y + ukX
(k )
j2
|Y = 0, X˜ (k )j2 > 0,X
(k )
j2
> 0]
· Pr(X (k )j2 > 0)
= 1 − π (k )j2
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Now we have
E[Γ˜2 − Γ2] ≥ (π (k )j1 + π
(k)
j2
)(1/2 + π (k )j2 )(1 − π
(k )
j2
)
For simplicity, let τ = π (k )j1 + π
(k )
j2
∈ [0, 1] and x = π (k )j2 , then we
have
f (x) = E[Γ˜2 − Γ2] − 1/2 · π (k )j1 = τ (1/2 + x)(1 − x) − 1/2 · (τ − x).
Notice that f is a quadratic function in x whose quadratic term has
negative coefficient, therefore if f (0) ≥ 0 and f (1) ≥ 0, then for any
x ∈ [0, 1] we have f (x) ≥ 0 and the claim is proved. It is easy to
see that f (0) = 0, and f (1) = 1/2 · (1 − τ ) ≥ 0, hence, the claim is
proved. □
D PROOF OF LEMMA 2
PROOF. Without loss of generality we assume that a1 ≥ a2 ≥
· · ·an . We define
f (a1,a2, · · · ,an ) =
∑
S ∈A
(
∑
j ∈S
aj )m .
For arbitrary i < j and some small ϵ ≥ 0 such that ai−1 ≥ ai + ϵ ,
aj − ϵ ≥ aj+1, we prove in the following that
f (· · · ,ai−1,ai+ϵ,ai+1, · · · ,aj−1,aj−ϵ,aj+1, · · · ) ≥ f (a1,a2, · · · ,an ).
For simplicity we write f (a1,a2, · · · ,an ) = fi, j (ai ,aj ). We have
fi, j (ai + ϵ,aj − ϵ)
=
∑
S :S ∈A
i, j<S
(
∑
h∈S
ah )m +
∑
S :S ∈A
i ∈S, j<S
(ai + ϵ +
∑
h∈S,h,i
ah )m
+
∑
S :S ∈A
i<S, j ∈S
(aj − ϵ +
∑
h∈S,h,j
ah )m +
∑
S :S ∈A
i, j ∈S
(
∑
h∈S
ah )m
Consider the function д(x) = xm . Due to its convexity, for x + ϵ >
x > y > y − ϵ , we have
д(x + ϵ) + д(y − ϵ) ≥ д(x) + д(y).
Hence, let A ′ = {S |S ⊆ {1, 2, · · · ,n} \ {i, j}, |S | = k − 1}, then for
any S ′ ∈ A ′, we have
(
∑
h∈S ′
ah + ai + ϵ)m + (
∑
h∈S ′
ah + aj − ϵ)m
≥ (
∑
h∈S ′
ah + ai )m + (
∑
h∈S ′
ah + aj )m ,
therefore, fi, j (ai + ϵ,aj − ϵ) ≥ fi, j (ai ,aj ). Now we can iteratively
change a1,a2, · · · ,an into a′1,a′2, · · · ,a′n such that a′i = δ for 1 ≤
i ≤ 1/δ , and a′i = 0 otherwise, and get
f (a1,a2, · · · ,an ) ≤ f (a′1,a′2, · · · ,a′n ).
It is not difficulte to compute that
f (a′1,a′2, · · · ,a′n ) =
(
1/δ
k
)
(kδ )m ≤ (1/δ )
k
k! · ζ
m ≤ ( e
ζ
)kζm ,
where for the last inequality we make use of the Stirling’s approxi-
mation that k! ≥ (k/e)k . Hence, the lemma is proved. □
E PROOF OF LEMMA 4
PROOF OF LEMMA 4. Consider the event that at most θn trans-
actions are selected bym miners for some θ ∈ (0, 1). Note that in this
case m =
∑n
j=1
∑m
i=1 π
(i)
j ≥ n/2, hence n ≤ 2m. Again we define
A = {S |S ⊆ {1, 2, · · · ,n}|, |S | = (1 − θ )n} as the superset of all the
subsets of cardinality (1 − θn). The probability that miner i does
not select any transaction in some S ∈ A is 1 − ∑j ∈S π (i)j . Given
that miners select transactions independently, the probability that all
miners do not select transactions in S is
m∏
i=1
(1 −
∑
j ∈S
p
(i)
j ) ≤ (
m −∑j ∈S ∑mi=1 π (i)j
m
)m
≤ (m −
(1−θ )n
2
m
)m ≤ e− (1−θ )n2 ,
where the first inequality follows by inequality of arithmetic and
geometric means, the second inequality follows by the fact that∑m
i=1 π
(i)
j ≥ 1/2, and the third inequality follows by (1−1/x)x ≤ e−1
for x ≥ 1. Taking the summation over all possible S ∈ A, the
probability that at most θn transactions are selected is at most∑
S ∈A
m∏
i=1
(1 −
∑
j ∈S
p
(i)
j ) ≤
(
n
θn
)
e−
(1−θ )n
2
≤ n
θn
(θn)! · e
− (1−θ )n2
≤ ( e
θ
)θn · e− (1−θ )n2 .
Taking θ = e−2, simple calculation shows that the right side of the
inequality above is ecn for c ≤ −0.02, and the lemma is proved. □
F PROOF OF LEMMA 3
PROOF OF LEMMA 3. Consider the event that at most k different
transaction are selected bym miners. LetA = {S |S ⊆ {1, 2, · · · ,n}|, |S | =
k} be the superset of all subsets of cardinality k. For any S ∈ A,
let σS be any mapping that maps {1, 2, · · · ,m} to S , and ΩS be the
set of all such mappings. Consider the event that miner i selects
transaction σS (i), we know that the event happens with the prob-
ability Pr(σS ) = ∏mi=1 π (i)σS (i). Taking summation over all possible
mappings, the event that only transactions in S are selected is at most∑
σS ∈ΩS
Pr(σS ) =
∑
σS ∈ΩS
m∏
i=1
π
(i)
σS (i) =
m∏
i=1
∑
j ∈S
π
(i)
j .
The last equality follows as when we expand
∏m
i=1
∑
j ∈S π
(i)
j , any
summand corresponds to
∏m
i=1 π
(i)
σ (i) for some mapping σ . Using the
the inequality of arithmetic and geometric means, we have∑
σS ∈ΩS
Pr(σS ) =
m∏
i=1
∑
j ∈S
π
(i)
j ≤ (
∑m
i=1
∑
j ∈S π
(i)
j
m
)m = (
∑
j ∈S
∑m
i=1 π
(i)
j
m
)m .
Taking summation over all possible S ∈ A, the event that at most k
transactions are selected is at most∑
S ∈A
∑
σS ∈ΩS
Pr(σS ) ≤
∑
S ∈A
(
∑
j ∈S
∑m
i=1 π
(i)
j
m
)m .
Now let aj =
∑m
i=1 π
(i )
j
m . It is easy to see that
∑n
j=1 aj = 1. Fur-
thermore, since
∑m
i=1 π
(i)
j < 12∆, we have aj ≤ 12∆/m. We apply
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Lemma 2 by taking δ = 1⌈m/(12∆)⌉ ≤ 12∆/(m+ 12∆), ζ = kδ ≤ e−1,
we know that ∑
S ∈A
∑
σS ∈ΩS
Pr(σS ) ≤ ekζm−k ≤ e−m/2.
Hence, the lemma is proved. □
G PROOF OF LEMMA 7
PROOF OF LEMMA 7. According to Theorem 3, we focus on the
event that |Lt | ≤ 5s for all t ≥ 0, which happens with 1 − O(ϵ)
probability.
For h ≥ t , let Ψh be the subset of blocks in Lh which has a
directed path from some fixed block τ0 ∈ Lt , which is a random
subset. Letψh = E(|Ψh |). Consider Lh+1. For any block τi ∈ Lh+1,
let Xi be a binary random variable indicating whether τi refers to
some block in Ψh , and hence admits a directed path from τ0. Then
we know
Pr(Xi = 1) =
( |Ψh |
2
)
+ |Ψh |(|Lh | − |Ψh |)( |Lh |
2
)
=
|Ψh |(2|Lh | − |Ψh | − 1)
|Lh |(|Lh | − 1)
.
We consider |Ψh+1 |. It is obvious that if |Ψh | = |Lh |, then every
block in Lh+1 refers to some block in Ψh and thus admits a directed
path from τ0, hence, |Lh+1 | = |Ψh+1 |, and similarly we have |Lh+j | =
|Ψh+j | for all j ≥ 1.
Otherwise, we assume 1 ≤ |Ψh | ≤ |Lh |−1. Then 2|Lh |−|Ψh |−1 ≥
|Lh |, and we have
E(Xi ) = E
( |Ψh |(2|Lh | − |Ψh | − 1)
|Lh |(|Lh | − 1)
)
≥ ψh|Lh | − 1
.
Note that |Ψh+1 | =
∑
i Xi . It is easy to calculate that
ψh+1 = E(|Ψh+1 |) ≥ ψh
(
1 + 1|Lh | − 1
)
.
This means, starting from ψt = 1, for each ψh where h ≥ t ,
either ψh = |Lh | and thus ψh′ = |Lh′ | for all h′ ≥ h, or ψh+1 ≥(
1 + 1|Lh |−1
)
ψh . Since |Lh | ≤ 5s, it is easy to see thatψh increases
to a value sufficiently close to |Lh | ≤ 5s when h ≥ t + O(s log s),
and the theorem is proved. □
